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ABSTRACT
INFORMAL CREDIT - OR, HOW DOES A RURAL COMMUNITY CAPITALIZE ITSELF?
C.R. Cross Centre for Applied Social Science U. Natal Durban
Moves are now in train to make land in rural black areas mortgageable in 
order to let prospective farmers borrow agricultural capital. Some of the 
assumptions involved should be questioned - evidence from other Third 
World countries suggests that mortgaging can lead to peasants losing their 
inherited land, only to remain in the community, worse impoverished than 
before. In addition, even where formal credit is legally available, 
providers of formal loans appear rarely willing and/or effective in 
lending to rural peasants. At the root of this situation lies the 
isolation of rural areas and the orevailing poverty of their economy, 
which creates massive distribution problems. The difficulty of getting 
goods and services from the urban core into rural communities is likely to 
apply as much to credit as to any other formal-sector commodity wanted in 
rural areas.
In addition, further difficulties may develop if formal credit 
institutions succeed in reaching rural communities: in terms of
development credit planning, hard-won rural savings which are desperately 
needed to bankroll development should not be drained off to the developed 
urban sector. Future rural credit initiatives therefore should probably 
be based on the borrower's ability to repay rather than on pledging land 
as security; in addition, they should give attention to the issue of savings.
These and other development objectives cannot be undertaken unless the 
present situation on the ground is fully understood. This paper reports 
some preliminary results of an on-going study into informal credit, the 
loan-granting arm of the informal sector. This study is being carried 
out in a relatively better-off peri-urban area of KwaZulu, which has a 
very strong, widely diffused informal sector supplying roughly one-third 
of the average household income. Areas of inquiry include the demand for 
credit, the debt burden, how informal credit now works, and whether formal 
credit can be expected to do it better.
Results suggest that credit - lending between individuals and through 
semi-institutional credit associations - is the economic lifeblood of rural
2communities, helping them to survive in the cash economy. For credit to 
work in the rural context, it has to be available from within the 
community, on very short notice; informal lending is therefore usually 
the only viable form of credit available. In KwaZulu, preliminary 
inquiries suggest that a thick, thriving, dense and resilient network of 
informal lending and borrowing connections is common in rural areas.
Results indicate that the average personal debt burden for informal 
lending is quite substantial, and higher for men than for women. Loans 
appear to be fairly easily available up to about R 100, but become harder 
to get above that level unless the individual is well placed in the credit 
network. Regardless, most men and many women have experience with 
informal loans in the R100-500 bracket. Informal credit is also very 
important in capitalizing the informal sector. In addition, one of most 
common uses cited for informal borrowing is in the important area of 
house-buiIding. A substantial amount of credit also goes to consumption - 
cash shortfalls due to low wages - rather than to capitalization.
While informal-credit is well-adapted to capitalizing small-to-medium 
selling and distribution activity, its quick rate of turnover is not ideal 
in relation to agriculture. However, the usual level of demand for credit 
to help with agriculture appears to be usually very small in peri-urban 
areas - results so far suggest scattered loans of less than R 20 which are 
considered unimportant, with a relatively low household priority. Format 
credit would then be very uneconomic, and therefore not likely to be an 
improvement. It is suggested that the best way to help capitalize peri­
urban agriculture is to attack bottlenecks in the provision of inputs, so 
as to improve returns and make it more worthwhile for families to borrow 
small informal loans when credit is needed.
As the informal economy works, the role of informal savings seems to be to 
put disposable money into debt obligati cos which can be used to establish 
a line of informal credit and secure loans quickly in case of need. 
Inquiries about acceptable credit sources indicate that most people think 
of their own family first, in addition to local credit societies, friends 
from work, and employers. Banks seem to have a very unfavorable image; 
they appear remote and strict, and respondents seemed unaware that bank 
credit may be cheaper.
3The single major problem with informal loans now available is their high 
cost - interest rates have risen rapidly and now run between 25 and 50 %. 
However, these rates seem to be regarded as normal and legitimate by the 
community. Results therefore suggest that trying to make mortgages 
available in rural communities in the belief that agriculture can be 
substantially assisted is not likely to be effective. Efforts can perhaps 
better be directed to increasing economic activity generally.
Recommendations for bringing formal credit into a position where it can 
help development in areas of this type include:
1. making formal sector loans in the R 300 - 1000 bracket available 
through employers, on a readily transferable basis, to help 
capitalize home construction and larger informal operations;
2. using formal savings facilities, to be made available at pension 
points on a bi-monthly basis, to enable rural people to establish an 
informal line of credit in their home community able to help with 
immediate consumption needs and smaller informal operations.
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INFORMAL CREDIT - OR, HOW DOES A RURAL COMMUNITY CAPITALIZE ITSELF?
1. Introduction: some issues in rural credit
Credit, it is generally agreed, is one of the most basic ingredients 
in any successful recipe for development - and in Southern Africa, the 
development debate seems now to be beginning to work out alternatives. 
Moves are already well advanced toward making rural land and property 
mortgageable, so that they can be negotiated in the formal-sector 
credit market. Underlying these moves there seems to be an unquestioned 
assumption that formal credit is the best way to capitalize rural 
enterprise, either business or agriculture, and therefore formal credit 
institutions ought to enter into the rural areas as quickly as possible.
At some level, this must hold true - but on the basis of some of the 
literature, and also from the standpoint of some fairly extended 
fieldwork in KwaZulu/Nata l, some of the implications of this point of 
view may be open to question. On this critical point of rural credit 
mortgaging specifically, here is the respected rural economist Polly 
Hill discussing Nigeria and India:
"Mortgaging is all too often the prelude to (reluctant) selling - the 
debtor usually getting much less than the market pr i ce...Several 
Harijans related in heart-broken fashion how their farms had been 
'seized' by their c redi tors.^It is possible that in both 
regions a great proportion of all land transfers, other than those 
involving fathers and sons, result from the failure of mortgagors to 
redeem their land..." (1982, 122, 215)
Hill, who has consistently made the issue of credit and capital in the 
rural village context one of the cardinal points of her inquiry, 
drives home her point by remarking that formal lending does not operate 
particularly efficiently in the rural context: to quote further.
"Since official agencies are primarily interested in good-quality land 
as security for loans, and are uninterested in small holdings of dry 
land, the great bulk of the village population is unable to borrow 
on any sort of commercial basis outside their own community."
and finally:
"Nor do richer potential bor rowers...ne cessar i L y find it at all easy to 
borrow the sums they miaht require.-They are likely to find it 
difficult to raise the large obligatory bribes that are the concomitant 
of all official transactions, as well as to overcome the resistance of 
potential creditors...Cnot only because their land is unproductive but] 
because, when it comes to the crunch and the land is auctioned by the 
creditor owing to default on the loan, the villagers are likely to gang 
up against him to ensure that he gets a low price."
2Hill stops short of condemning the idea of mortgaging outright, but 
her general view seems to fall in line with that of authorities who have 
advocated using the principle of the borrower's ability to repay, rather 
than any particular form of pledged collateral, to decide whether or not 
the prospective borrower should get the loan. Dell'Amore states this 
vi ewpoint:
"Loan repayment depends of the borrower's present or future earnings 
capacity, and this is the best security for a loan, even when it cannot 
be backed by real assets or personal guarantees...' (1973, 14)
In another forum, (1975, 23-27) he makes the further important point 
that preventing the drain of rural savings into the urban credit market 
is of cardinal importance in mobilizing the necessary resources for 
agricultural development - and the same can be said with greater force 
for rural development in general.
More locally and more recently, Nattrass and Glass (1986) among others, 
take a similar approach to the question of repayment in the urban 
context*. This kind of approach, however, still relies on the borrower 
making contact with the formal■credit market. The single main problem 
with development-related credit for rural areas is probably the same as 
it is for nearly any other development-related operation - formal-sector 
credit, like the rest of the formal economy, has a massive distribution 
problem relative to rural areas. Just the same as the commerce and 
industry they serve, formal lending institutions are likely to have 
great physical and economic difficulty in getting their services into 
rural communi t i es.
The point which Hill wants to emphasize is that credit is absolutely
essential to life in a rural community, but that in the nature of the
situation rural lending usually if not invariably needs to take place at
the extreme micro-local level, in face-to-face, day-to-day interaction -
a principle she refers to as the 'localization of credit-granting'.
Hill does not reject the idea of making formal credit available to rural
villagers, but she takes a relatively forboding view of the chances of
doing it effectively. In particu 
;* f> o s v b it  f» '-p ri»> w /af£  tooZi'cable.
obtaining a thorough understanding of the situation on the ground.
*Citinq, for instance the practice in Mexico City of commercial banks 
providing capital to street se 11ers on a one-day basis at a rate of 1% .
ar, she-warns that it is almost 
-/'Vs ‘r
3For development in South Africa, it may be important then that not much 
attention seems to have gone so far to the way credit works in the black 
rural regions*. Specifically, to fill in the background before mounting 
an attempt to bring formal credit to outlying areas, it would seem that 
there ought to be some investigation of the actual on-the-ground 
situation in regard to credit at present. The means which these 
communities are now using to fill shortfalls and mobilize capital is 
informal credit: the personal loans and semi-institutional transactions
which form the loan-granting arm of the informal sector.
The question I therefore want to address in this paper is, what form 
does rural credit take at present? And along with this, what form 
does the credit demand take in a sample community, what is the credit 
market like, and how do people see the credit environment?
These are pretty ambitious objectives. Measured against them, this paper 
is really a very unfinished and preliminary effort, written in a hurry, 
from an incomplete data base. Interviews are still coming in and the 
results presented here are drawn from a hand tabulation of 63 schedules 
drawn from a peri-urban sample in KwaZulu. More important, the large 
literature that deals with topics such as rotating credit associations 
and the role of loan credit in underpinning development has only been 
scratched. What follows is therefore being offered in the spirit of 
helping to increase the information now available on rural credit.
2. Rural credit in _a migrant labor economy_______________________
Looking at loan transactions inside KwaZulu indicates that the situation 
is not essentially different from other Third World regions. A thick, 
thriving, dense and resilient network of personal loan transactions 
seems to be characteristic of vast areas outside the cities. What is
*The importance of the informal sector is now generally recognized, and 
a number of studies are now appearing (Maasdorp, 1983, McCarthy 1981,
Preston-Whyte 1984, 1986 forthcoming) many of which discuss the question 
of credit. Nattrass and Glass (1986) specifically recommend the 
creation of new types of credit with lower admin costs, and emphasize 
the point that credit for informal enterprises has to be immediately 
available, preferably on an over-the-counter basis. On the other hand, 
credit in itself is a topic which urgently needs to be studied fully.
Asignificant for development is that this network of credit 
transactions seems to be the source from which the informal sector draws 
much if not most of its capital. The next question then has to be, 
whether informal credit is a harmful system as it now operates, or, 
to look at it another way, whether the formal credit market can expect 
to take over and do it better. The important issues are usually seen as 
the capitalization of agriculture and the informal sector; but they 
might better be seen as meeting rural needs and encouraging the 
circulation of money in the rural community.
This informal credit system in the black areas of rural South Africa 
appears to have much milder consequences for development than some of 
the informal credit systems encountered in other parts of the Third 
World, and particularly in southern and eastern Asia, where moneylenders 
and landlords often hold the peasant villages in a kind of tenacious 
debt enslavement .
Instead, it seems to be an ill wind that blows exclusively bad luck; 
even under the prevailing migrant labor system, with its crippling 
inequities, enough money is coming in from the formal sector to provide 
even very poor communities with some degree of economic alternative. In 
addition, the massive economic competition from large-scale industrial 
farming which saps the viability of home agricultural production also 
makes the problem of capitalizing agriculture less desperately urgent 
than it would otherwise become. One of the consequences is that rural 
families seem to avoid the kind of hopelessly undei— capitalized 
exclusive reliance on the land which leads directly into debt, even if 
the system also conspicuously fails to help them escape poverty. 
Consequently, money-lenders don't seem to get the kind of lock on the 
local economy that frequently develops in genuinely agrarian societies.
In addition, the cash economy seems to be enabling small nuclear 
families to become the norm. Perhaps as a consequence, it would also 
seem as if in many places locally the extended family doesn't dominate 
the capitalization of business as much as in other parts of Africa - 
nuclear families here show a strong tendency to take up their social and 
economic independence as soon as they can control a source of cash 
(Reader, 1966).
5Wage work in the cities also means that some small quantity of money 
does flow directly to rural families on a more or less monthly basis, 
without having to wait for the harvest. Once inside the community, 
informal sector activities have the potential for, and in at least some 
areas actually succeed in (Cross 8 Preston-Whyte, 1983, Ardington, 
1984b), circulating this outside money around the locaL economy until 
a genuine multiplier effect may begin to be felt. The seminal 
problem with the rural economy is then likely to be that not enough 
money is coming into it.
If this is the case, then the deepest and most harmful inequity of the 
migrant labor system may be the unfair terms of trade on which rural 
communities sell their labor in the cities: the great majority of rural
families are still on the edge of poverty and most are probably below, 
continually falling short of the basic commodities they need. To cite 
Polly Hill again, a high percentage of rural debt transactions actually 
cover consumption rather than capitalization (1982, 115) - and this 
situation is a legitimate child of necessity, which has to be taken into 
account in formulating credit policy.
3. Credit in _a semi-rural community, KwaZulu______________________
This paper then represents a preliminary exploration of some of the 
early results from a study of informal credit which is still in 
progress. The study is being built onto a peri-urban data base 
which was originally established, dating from about 1972, in order to 
study land tenure and land-based organization. The field study for 
this paper has been done starting from February of this year, in an 
area of the peri-urban district of KwaZulu which we have been 
referring to as KwaNgele in order to carry out promises to respondents 
of complete and totat anonymity.
3.1 Poverty and wealth: the local economy at KwaNgele
KwaNgele is a semi-rural district over thirty kilometers from Durban. 
Within it there are both rapidly modernizing, suburban-like localities 
with very dense settlement occupying the high ground along the main 
line of transport, and remaining areas of more traditional settlement 
located in the remoter hlanzeni districts in the hot thornbush climate
6of the lower-lying river valleys. The area where the credit survey 
is going on includes some of the most modern localities, but also 
stretches across the plateau to include the outlying fringes of a 
region under traditional occupation.
As settlement modernizes, the economy modernizes too. Since the land 
system and the local economy are inextricably wound up together, the 
base study included a compilation of the necessary data to estimate 
total household income. These results have been used, updated where 
necessary, to support further investigations done together with 
Eleanor Preston-Whyte, into the informal sector and the local economy 
(Preston-Whyte and Cross 1982, Cross and Preston-Whyte, 1983, 1984)
This present study is therefore an outgrowth of our earlier work 
with income distribution and the household economy.
On the evidence of our 1981 data, the average income of the KwaNgele 
families in this same sample was above the Household Effective Level, as 
adjusted for local family size. The baseline data reflected not only 
higher average incomes, but also much more reliance on informal sector 
activities and much more economic participation by women occurring in 
the regions of modern-type settlement.
The proportion of families caught in what was locally evaluated as 
severe poverty - translating as an income level below R 100 a month - 
was 12%. In comparison, roughly a third of the community's 
households were estimated to be taking in more than R 500 a month, and 
were considered well off or rich. As black communities outside the 
cities went at the time, KwaNgele was comparatively prosperous, with a 
thriving informal sector which was able to generate employment for a 
fair number of local residents. Income from informal economic 
activities made up roughly a third of the total income of an average 
household in the sample we studied, and we have no reason to believe 
that it is any less significant now - if anything, the trend may be 
the other way.
3.2 Studying credit at KwaNgele - objectives, methods and shortfalls 
3.2.1: Formulating the goals
The object of the inquiry as originally framed was to took at the 
total environment of credit in this quasi-rural community, with the
7particular aim of modelling the ways in which people think about 
lending and borrowing as part of economic and social life. The main 
focus has been on personal lending and indebtedness, as it forms a 
system with institutional credit; although it sometimes seems to be 
taken for granted that the rotating credit associations locally called 
stockfels are the chief form of informal credit, this is probably not 
the case in most places any more than it is at KwaNgele. Stockfels 
are an important and integral part of the rural (and urban) credit 
environment, and there has been considerable debate over how much they 
can actually contribute towards capitalizing development*, but the data 
from KwaNgele suggests that they are only part of the total credit 
network. On the assumption that most informal credit is not of the 
rotating variety, the present study has taken personal debts rather 
than rotating credit as its main focus.
The specific topics which have been investigated include where loans 
come from and go to, the preference given to specific credit sources, 
and what uses for credit are acceptable and unacceptable. Some 
attempt has also been made to estimate the actual size of the credit 
burden, as well as the rates of interest which are characteristically 
involved. In addition, there are questions relating to how the 
community and the individual creditor can hope to enforce the 
repayment of loans, and to how people think about credit generally.
Finally, there has also been additional interviewing on the side about 
the demand for and use of credit in relation to informal businesses 
and agricultural production - these issues didn't make it onto the 
main schedule, it was simply getting too long and exhausting. 
Accordingly, the results on these important points are in particularly 
scrappy form.
3.2.2: Believing the results?
The overall design of the study was originally supposed to include
* Hill is of the opinion that rotating credit groups may make 
people feel good, out do not real ly provide significant capital to 
enterprises in the local economy (1982, 217). On the other hand, the 
black American economist Thomas Sowall, who has studied the 
comparative economic success of different ethnic communities arriving 
in the United States, feels that the Japanese immigrant community usëd 
rotating credit groups as one of their main instruments for capitalizing 
their spectacular economic success (1981).
8more or Less 80 cases, drawn from the same households which participated 
in the 1980-82 study. Here, trying to arrange for a representative 
sample may possibly have hindered rather than helped in obtaining 
accurate results for some of the questions. In collecting credit texts 
to go along with the survey interviewing, respondents tended to get 
chosen who were likely to be willing to provide truthful and reasonably 
full accounts. Obviously, this could not be guaranteed for the survey 
respondents; consequently, the usual problem in persuading people to 
part with details of their financial position complicates evaluation of 
the data.
In the Third World even more than in the First World, a very decorous 
veil of privacy characteristically covers the whole subject of personal 
indebtedness. What people do with their lending and borrowing reflects 
on how they acknowledge their complicated and conflicting obligations to 
relatives, friends and neighbors. In particular, people tend to be very 
nervous of being found out spending money on themselves while the claims 
of others hover around the situation. Hill refers to this reluctance to 
be questioned about credit dealings as "bashfuLness" and remarks on how 
characteristic it is in the village context. In her view, the results 
of any interview study of personal indebtedness are extremely suspect.
It would be very difficult to disagree with this authoritative view.
More than on any other interview survey we have done at KwaNgele, all 
the people who have worked on the credit and debt study have been aware 
that respondents were not reporting as fully and accurately as they 
usually have in the past - and the past, in this case, includes a study 
of household income which asked a large number of pointed questions 
about personal income. For the questions relating to the total debt 
burden, we tried to get around this as much as possible by not asking 
exactly how much money is owed to whom exactly, and by requesting 
amounts by intervals if the respondent didn't care to itemize precise 
amounts. This seems to have worked reasonably well, but it is still 
likely that there is a systematic error factor involved.
What can be said in favor of reporting the results anyway is that the 
distortion in the replies coming in seems to run to a pattern, which can 
then be allowed for in constructing interpretations. There has been
9very little indication that people are actually fabricating their 
replies - instead, what seems to be going on is that respondents are not 
reporting all their actual credit transactions. Return visits made by 
annoyed interviewers in cases where we got wind of some credit transfer 
that had conveniently been forgotten also suggested that people were 
frequently interpreting the question about the largest loan they had 
ever taken by assuming we meant the largest loan they had currently.
But further cross-checking also suggests that while loans in the medium­
sized bracket, between about ten rand and a hundred, were being reported 
fairly accurately, the larger loans - of the kind it is most stressful 
to report on - were still being under-enumerated by an unknown factor.
At the same time, the very small loans, where people are likely to have 
a number owing in both directions at the same time, were being shunted 
aside as unimportant and likewise under-reported, not least because it 
is genuinely difficult to work out how many and how large exactly these 
small loans add up to be. Likewise, the interviewers are of the opinion 
that the younger respondents have been more consistently truthful than 
some of the older people, and the poor - who have little money anyway - 
more than the rich, who have more to conceal.
Proceeding on the principle that in a situation where accurate data is 
very hard to come by, even somewhat shaky information is better than 
none at all, the results can then be evaluated in the light of the known 
direction of error. Perhaps more reassuring, it seems tentatively sound 
to conclude that the KwaNgele debt burden is at least as high what the 
data indicate.
Finally, with schedules continuing to come in, nothing as yet has been 
formally coded for computer analysis, and the results given here are 
taken from 68 schedules which have been rather hastily tabulated by 
hand. This lets out any real depth of analysis, so we will really be 
looking only at some basic factors such as age, sex, and estimated 
household income, in relation to some aspects of the informal credit 
market.
A. Results: perspectives on informal credi t in a_ peri-urban area
KwaNgele is a community in the process of changing over from the ethic 
of generalized reciprocity - the moral imperative to provide others with
1C
what they ask for or need without any expectation of direct repayment, 
which is the basis of traditional society - to a more modern system. In 
the cash economy, economic and social relations are based on balanced 
reciprocity, the principle that requests and needs should be honored on 
a fairly strict basis of exchange, or otherwise ignored.
The changeover is a prototypical agonizing reappraisal for everyone 
involved, which is generating acute strain. It is also causing a great 
deal of social steam to rise; these days, it is not unusual for family 
members to charge each other interest. And in this new morality, the 
solidarity and community spirit that were earlier provided by exchanges 
of gifts and services between relatives and neighbors are now provided 
by honoring the obligations of borrowing and loaning.
To introduce the practical environment of informal credit, here are some 
short statements written by people in the sample about their experience 
with informal and formal credit. Respondents' comments have been 
slightly condensed, but not edited otherwise.
Case 1: a_ married man working as an artisan1 s assistant
About stockfels:
I don't now play any stockfels, either here or at work. I did 
play one stockfel here with my neighbors - that was a fortnight 
stockfel paying R50 a head. I didn't borrow money from that 
stockfel, I just wanted to save with it. What I aid was this - 
I only asked that I could have the number one [when the credit 
rotation came around to pay]. That stockfel failed with the 
first round because the members lost jobs. So I lost my payout.
About loaning with friends and family:
I do lend money to my friends and close relatives, but not big 
amounts. Five rand, or ten or twenty. I don't charge any 
interest. I do borrow money from my friends without interest 
too, from two rand to five or ten rand - that's if I am short of 
bus fare, or credit for beers. A person not related to you won't 
tolerate you at all.
Before my brother-in-law died my father-in-law was usually coming 
to borrow money for them. Sometimes a hundred rand, or fifty 
rand. They never paid back that money, they said I was stilt 
owing them some cattle for ilobolo. Even now as they are both 
dead I do give my mother-in-law money and buy them things without 
asking them to pay me back.
About banks:
I never tried the bank. I don't know what interest they charge.
Case 2: a_ young woman doing domest i c work
About stockfels:
For me, to borrow from my stockfel club is all right - but this 
one that I belong to doesn't lend out more than a thousand rand. 
It's one that pays out yearly. The club doesn't give me any 
trouble if I fail to pay the interest on time.
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About borrowing from friends and family:
For myself, I borrow from friends, but not so much. To borrow 
big money from a relative is too hard. If you are working, most 
relatives think of coming to you to ask for money. I can borrow 
from my family, but only small money without interest. But one 
thing is sure, at the month end I've got to pay that money back, 
otherwise there's just too much hard words.
About banks:
I can try all those different places, but I don't think of going 
to banks.
Case 3: a_ young man recently married
About stockfels:
Credit is something that no one can live without today.
Those people who lend money to others for interest are doing a 
good thing - they help a lot by doing so. I am a member of a 
lending one myself.
About borrowing from family and friends:
I have been borrowing money with interest, but not big money.
The only big loan I took was from my family with no interest - in 
fact it was to pay for my wedding expenses. I borrowed two 
hundred rand and promised to pay it back from my bonus payout at 
the year end, and they gave me this money. At the end of the 
year I failed to pay all of it, I only paid back R 120 with some 
excuses for failing. I had to buy myself, my wife and my 
children some clothes for Christmas and some groceries.
About banks:
Banks don't just loan, if you've got nothing on your savings they 
want to know what you've got.
4.1 Availability of loans in the community: smaller borrowing
People borrow and lend simultaneously and deal with a number of other 
people at the same time; they also deal with the semi-formalized credit
associations called stockfels, as depositors and as borrowers, sometimes 
at the same time with the same group. Most people have a fairly complex 
pattern of debt and credit transactions at any given time.
Many if not most of these transactions appear to be small: these often
represent minor cash shortfalls, but they sometimes make up the working 
capital of the small informal selling enterprises, where five rand a day 
can cover supplies and expenses and a major capital loan can be under R 
20. These small credit transactions are under-represented in the data; 
most people seem to have a number of these debts and credits for a 
couple of rand.
In a community like KwaNgele where fairly substantial amounts of money 
do float around, people whose general financial position is reasonably 
sound usually seem to be able to get small and medium-sized loans 
locally when they want them; relatively few people indicated that they
12
had problems finding credit, though as many writers have stressed, the 
poor have great difficulty in finding credit even when they are 
desperate. One old widow who is now almost the last of her family and 
trying to make a living by selling traditional herbal remedies remarked, 
"Who can give me a loan - me in my rags, as they see I'm a louse-ridden 
person with no one to support me." And, when she was asked about 
borrowing for interest, she observed, "Since no one can loan me without 
interest, how can I ask an interest-bearing one?" Polly Hill sums up 
the position when she comments, "The condition of being 'too poor to 
borrow' is often worse than net indebtedness" (1982, 220). KwaNgele 
people clearly deal out their loans on a basis of ability to repay, 
combined with the prospective borrower's reputation and known probity.
4.2 Availability of loans in the community: larger borrowing
On the other hand, the survey results, taken together with texts 
collected from local people about their experience with larger loans, 
suggest that people often do run into trouble at the level of R100-200 
and upwards. Only people with substantial resources, or with 
understanding friends or family who have faith in their prospects, are 
regularly able to get loans in this bracket. One young man whose local 
reputation for industriousness was nothing very impressive gave a 
graphic account of how he searched frantically for someone to advance 
him R 600 when he had the chance to buy a van in good condition at a 
very reasonable price and enter the taxi business. By the second week, 
when he had had his third disappointment, he was in despair, "running 
back and forth tike an insane person, I did not speak to any person, I 
did not want to see them since they had all refused me - the world 
seemed black to me, and only my girlfriend tried to comfort me." He 
failed to raise his capital, and lost the van and his commercial 
opportunity.
On the other side of the picture, a prosperous and very we l l-organized 
young shack-shop owner reported in 1982 to us that he had raised the 
capital he needed to start his operation when a friend at work, a driver 
with substantial financial resources, simply agreed to "shock" him - 
lend the money (R 300) with no interest and no particular agreement 
about the time of repayment. This event seemed so interesting at the 
time that it ultimately launched the present study.
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While friends and distant relatives do sometimes provide large loans, 
the more usual source seems to be family, as described by the respondent 
in Case 3 above. Family members may also refuse - loans to relatives 
are far from automatic. When family members charge interest, it 
commonly leads to resentment, friction, and distance within the 
household. In addition, people can borrow large loans from some of the 
local credit associations, as described in Case 2 above. These loans 
are probably the ones that were most difficult to research, and which 
are most under-reported in the data.
4.3 Availability of Loans in the community: credit societies
The organizations called "stockfels" include two different types.
The first kind is the genuine rotating credit association, which is adapted 
to providing a means of saving in a credit environment which has no 
effective contact with the formal credit market. All members pay in a 
fixed amount - roughly five to a hundred rand or more - at fixed intervals. 
Each time the stockfel meets, one of the members takes all the money paid 
in that week as his or her payout, going around the whole group in rotation.
This basic type has a number of variations, but all the rotating types 
of credit society are probably losing ground these days, and are more 
popular with women than with men. This may be unfortunate: from the
standpoint of development one significant benefit is that their money is 
lent out into the community, where it can encourage a multiplier effect, 
instead of being funnelled into the urban-based formal-sector credit 
market, which doesn't need it. In this respect, they are an effective 
means of mobilizing rural savings for the expansion of the local economy.
In contrast, the other competing form of stockfel is a new adaptation, 
which connects the local informal credit market firmly to organized 
formal-sector credit. Although it is also a kind of savings 
association, it is a much more sophisticated operation which requires 
modern skills to operate. What is more, it appears to be widespread in 
the developing world: here is William Davis describing a similar type
of credit cooperative in the context of a Phillippine market:
"Unlike the rotating association, in none of the Baguio market 
cooperatives are regular contributions to the fund a stipulation, and 
the amounts contributed are fixed only in the sense that there is a
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minimum acceptable amount.-Moreover, none of them permits the borrowing 
of money without interest...Loans were not limited to members of the 
association, but when non-members borrowed money much more interest was 
charged..." (1973, 178-79)
At KwaNgele, members likewise pay in variable amounts at different 
times, which are recorded by the secretary and officers in the books.
These amounts are then either lent out or taken straight to Pinetown and 
deposited in the bank. But unlike the Phillippine market cooperative,
the KwaNgele type is not as purely a loan association - it distributes the 
accumulated principal in proportionate shares to all the members at 
the end of the year. In one case, the bank manager asked the officers 
of the association to give him a day's notice next time the withdrawal 
was wanted, since R 16 000 was quite a lot for the bank to produce on 
short notice.
The chief limitation on the success of this type of operation seems to 
be the heavy bookkeeping needed - the group mentioned above has not been 
able to work out a good system for sharing out the bank interest, so 
rather than going through the contortions of trying to work it out they 
hold a massive year-end party on which they spend all of it.
The members of this type of stockfel tend to be men, and are drawn from 
the prosperous end of the community. And in addition to the heavy 
interest they charge, which tends to keep them out of the venture 
capital market (see also Nattrass and Glass, 1986), their rise means 
that the rural community has discovered a new way to encourage the 
organized financial markets to exploit its savings, to the detriment of 
the local economy.
5. Results: the debt burden and the uses of debt_________ ______
In this kind of social and economic context, the average debt burden is 
not insignificant - the more so if it is true that the debt load 
reported may only represent a glimpse of the bottom of the iceberg, with 
a considerable percentage of the larger loans still going unreported. 
Likewise, it did not include hire-purchase obligations, which are 
endemic in the area and may run very high relative to individual monthly 
income. Against this background, the average reported debt burden for 
men was R 170, and that for women was R 81. The figures for reported 
individual indebtedness are then distributed as follows:
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Table 1
THE DEBT BURDEN: SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTED PERSONAL DEBT
AND CREDIT LOADS
percentage distribution
Borrowing Lending
MEN WOMEN MEM WOMEN
R 0-5 10% 16% 23% 19%
R 6-20 7 6 17 16
R 21-50 20 38 20 48
R 51-100 13 13 20 9
R 101-200 37 28 7 9
R 201 + 13 - 13 3
30 32 30 32
Although it is likely, for the reasons suggested above, that the total 
distribution of reported debt and credit burdens has been compressed 
downwards by undei— reporting, the trend still appears to be that men 
both lend and borrow more than women do - which is a priori very 
probable. But in addition, there seems to be a bimodal distribution for 
both men's and women's lending, with peaks between 21 and 50 rand, and 
also between 100 and 200 rand. If this is accurate, then the sample 
appears to show two characteristic levels of borrowing. If the peak at 
R 21-50 reflects a cautious attitude or a low level of credit demand, 
the one at R 100 - 200 would seem to indicate a relatively confident 
attitude and perhaps more involvement in enterprises that need credit.
A look at the distribution by income classes suggests that there are 
some substantial differences.
The distribution of results here is probably fairly accurate in 
suggesting that younger women whose families are not poor are likely to 
have a rough balance between credits and debits - many women in this 
group report that they are wholly supported by their families, and do 
not actually carry financial responsibility. Their lending and 
borrowing then becomes partly social. Women in this situation usually 
avoid interest-bearing loans, and their low level of involvement in the 
credit market pulls down the mean for this group, which does include 
married women involved in informal enterprises who do use credit 
actively and regularly. Women in this group made remarks like these: 
"My husband doesn't like that loan business"
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Table 2
THE DEBT BURDEN: MEAN REPORTED DEBTS AND LOANS BY ESTIMATED INCOME
TOTAL DEBTS TOTAL LOANS
YOUNGER MEN. HIGHER INCOME 
(age less tnan 35, HH income 
estimated above R 300 a month)
R 120 R 149 N = 6
OLDER MEN, HIGHER INCOME 
(ace over 35. HH income 
estimated above R 300 a month)
R 233 R 72 16
MEN ANY AGE, LOWER INCOME 
(HH income estimated under
R 82 R 31 8
-30
R 299 a month)
YOUNGER WOMEN, HIGHER INCOME 
(age less than 35, HH income 
estimated above R 300 a month)
R 58 R 51 9
OLDER WOMEN, HIGHER INCOME 
(age over 36, HH income 
estimated above R 300)
R 121 R 52 12
WOMEN ANY AGE, LOWER INCOME 
(HH income estimated under 
R 299 a month)
R 51 R 50 11
— 32
N = 62
"It's a disgrace for women 
of paying
to go looking for
interest, anc"No, I am afraid
as people think he is a rich man."
"The thing is, I am still schooling, so 
- only small money with school friends" 
"Well, I am still a kid staying at home
interest-bearing loans"
,*t '
If I need money, 
but also:
my brothers can just snock
my husband can' be pleased,
I don't do anything with credits 
need to do anything.so I don't 
me"
"Yes, I use credits every day to buy my stock, but I try not to take 
that interest-bearing money."
Women in the poverty category are likely to show a similar credit 
pattern, but for different reasons. The same elderly traditional widow
quoted above also remarked:
"Yes, I do lend money - even me. I am compelled to do it if I can, so 
that others can help me when I need it."
On the same principle, older, poorer men's reported debts and credits 
may be a reasonable representation of their situation, though it is not 
easy to believe that they lend less than women in a similar income 
bracket. One reason is likely to be that these men are often elderly 
and retired - few younger men or women in this area are found in the 
lower income bracket. Like the younger women, these older men are often 
supported by their families if not on their pensions, where the older
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Low-income women are often widows or deserted wives whose children have 
Left home. For the men, family support often takes the form of 
borrowing "Loans" they have no intention on repaying:
"As my kids have money, I can just borrow from them, and then when the 
time comes I just don't pay back."
"I don't make important Loans now, my kids are working and my wife also 
gets pension"
"I don't Like credits because it can be a great mistake for an old man 
Like me to go to court."
"No credits, not at any time, sorry there - I am getting two pensions."
Similarly, the recorded result for younger men with adequate family 
incomes is probably near the mark. Most of the men in this category are 
earning, but even if married may still be at a stage in their lives when 
they are not expected to shoulder much responsibility. As a result, 
they are often in a better position to be frank about their credit 
position than older men. It is probably significant that this group was 
the only one which reported that their lending was well above their 
borrowing, reflecting a comfortable level of disposable income.
"Although I'm married now, for most of these needs I'm supported by my 
parents, I pay very few of the household expenses."
"As I've got too many friends I'm used to borrowing and making credits" 
"Well, I can help my friends, as they are used to helping me, so about 
these credits it depends"
The point where the results may be seriously understating the true 
situation is likely to be for older men (and women) in the social 
bracket which carries the heaviest financial responsibility. Both older 
men and older women of higher income report that their borrowing well 
exceeds their lending. To a great extent this may be accurate, as loans 
can be obtained from local money-lenders and very importantly from 
stockfels, but it is also in this social category that respondents may 
bemost reluctant to admit to credit transactions, and particularly to 
making loans.
Although nearly everyone insists that credit is essential to survival, 
it is still viewed as a very dubious activity in some quarters. An 
substratum of the older attitude structure still survives and colors 
contemporary thinking about credit: in this view, resorting to credit
is underhanded, irresponsible, and not respectable, as economic 
transactions should be carried on with money which has been fairly 
earned and is already in hand:
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"When I was not old we never did this thing, people could say it was 
a disgrace"
"I don’t think my ancestors could be pleased if I killed them a goat 
bought on credit, they can think I'm weak or mad"
"I can't just go and start trouble buying furniture and expensive things 
on credit, knowing that my pocket is not full enough to buy them."
Because of the relatively strong pressures on both men and women in the 
older, better-off category, it is not unlikely that borrowing and 
particularly lending in these groups are under-reported by an unknown 
percentage.
Finally, these figures can be related to people's reported experience 
with what are locally considered to be large debts. Respondents were 
asked the amount of the largest loan they had ever borrowed, and whether 
they felt afterwards that it had been all right, within their means, or 
otherwise that it had been too much.
Table 3
EXPERIENCE WITH CREDIT: SIZE OF LARGEST REPORTED LOAN
percentage distribution
Men Women
1-10
OK NOT OK OK NOT OK
0
11-30 - 7 - 3 10
31-50 - 1 4 8 13
51-100 3 4 1 7 15
101-500 10 6 5 2 23
500-1000 1 1 - - 2
1000 + 1 - - - 1
15 19 10 20 N = 64
The reported figures suggest that most men, but relatively fewer women, 
have experience with loans in the R 101—500 range. In addition, people 
who have loaned in the higher brackets are much more likely to consider 
the loan within their capacities. As might be expected, people who have 
remained at lower credit levels (and also have lower income levels ) are 
more inclined to be fearful or dissatisfied with the credit they have 
used, while the relatively well off enter the credit market on better 
terms and seem to meet what is perceived as greater success.
6. Results: the purposes of borrowing a loan
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Results here suggest that various informal enterprises are in fact major 
users of informal credit: 47% of the women in the sample reported that
they have used informal credit for either a large or a small informal 
enterprise, as against 21% of men. The difference is not surprising in 
view of our earlier figures on participation by men and women in
different types of informal operation. 
Table 4
USES OF CREDIT: PURPOSES REPORTED FOR
percentage distribution of 'yes' repli
For a small business at home 
For a larger kind of business 
Store account in town 
Local store account 
Other hire-purchase 
Personal emergency 
Family need (school fees, etc)
Help family member with problem 
Entertainment (party, dinner, etc.)
Women dominated in the selling
HAVING EVER TAKEN A LOAN
MEN WOMEN
15% 38% 18
6 9 5
36 26 21
18 29 16
36 23 20
76 76 52
18 23 14
36 38 32
44 26 24
N = 68
and distribution sector, which uses credit arrangements to supply 
working capital as well bankrolling its initial start-up or later 
expansion. By comparison, a much larger proportion of informally active 
men were in the service sector, employed as workers in informal 
businesses, or serving as local officials.
Both men and women also used credit frequently to help with store 
accounts or hire-purchase contracts, thereby using informal credit to 
translate the inelastic terms of formal credit into a more easily 
handled state, even if this also put them onto a higher interest rate. 
Both men and women also frequently took loans on behalf of close 
relatives who found themselves in need, and also very often used 
informal credit to pay for entertaining - either small-scale, in the 
form of buying drinks, or on a larger level, on important social 
occasions. But the single most frequent credit demand was in the 
category of personal emergencies - any kind of occasion where the
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respondent found himself caught short and had to borrow. To oversimplify, 
the use of credit then seems to fall into two major categories: the
first is economic, in the form of capital or bridging credit, and the 
second is personal and social, in paying for various cash shortfalls.
Asking respondents what their own most frequent use of credit was 
produced additional clarification about where loan money goes to. For 
men respondents, the categories most frequently reported were buying 
drinks and housebuilding, both at 42%. This was followed by paying for 
food at 38%, paying stockfel contributions at 25%, paying for transport 
at 21%, and covering expenses relating to sickness at 17%. For women, 
the equivalent sequence began with buying food at 64%, providing capital 
to an informal business at 44%, paying stockfel contributions, 
transport, and accounts at 28% each, paying school fees and buying 
clothing at 24% each, covering costs related to illness at 16%, and 
buying drinks at 12%.- Informal credit then covers some important 
functions in the community as well as in the economy of the household. 
Particularly, informal credit is closely involved in capitalizing the 
production sector, in the form of housebuilding and construction, as 
well as in bankrolling the informal distribution sector.
Informal credit is effectively adapted to small selling operations.
These have a low, rapid turnover, and frequently leave the operator in 
the position of being short of working capital and unable to pay 
suppliers. Informal credit also does produce initial venture capital, 
though people normally try to find someplace where they can borrow their 
initial capital without having to pay the steep rates characteristic of 
interest=bearing loans in the informal credit market. Starting an 
informal business is an area where the community gives very high 
approval (80%) to the use of informal interest-bearing loans - though 
approval here is not quite as high as for buying your stock for an 
existing informal enterprise (86%), or for putting into the expansion of 
an existing informal business (89%), which rate very high indeed.
Lastly, informal credit does play a role in household agriculture, 
though it seems to be much less salient here in the thinking of local 
people than it is in relation to business and construction. No one 
spontaneously put forward loans for cultivation as one of their main
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uses for credit. On investigating this point specifically, it turned 
out to be not uncommon; but peri-urban households generally try to hold 
a tight lid on their agricultural expenditure, and the amounts of 
agricultural capital actually provided locally out of the informal 
credit market seem to run mostly in the R5 - R 25 bracket. This type of 
borrowing tends to be very sporadic to boot, with a high percentage of 
the respondents who stated that they had at some time borrowed money to 
help in cultivation remarking that they had only done it once or twice, 
when money was needed more or less immediately and the family's 
resources would not quite cover it.
This need not rrrean that being able to borrow money for family 
agriculture is or has to be an insignificant aspect of the informal 
credit market. Since the peri-urban capital demand for agriculture is 
probably characteristically fairly low, it is possible that loans here 
may turn out to make up an important fraction of the total expenditure 
on household cultivation. At present, lacking a complete return on the 
agricultural credit survey, it is not really possible to say more about 
how much of KwaNgele's small agricultural production sector is drawing 
support from informal loans.
Since people put their informal loans to uses that are clearly 
significant both in development terms and in social terms, it may nto be 
surprising that 76% of women and 90 percent of men reported that the 
interest rates currently normal in the community (25-50% on a small loan 
for a week, and 25-30% on a larger loan for 1-3 months) were the same as 
the rates they regarded as 'reasonable'.
But at the same time, attitudes toward credit in general were 
ambivalent. The general moral view of the credit environment is that 
money should never be borrowed casually and interest-bearing loans 
expecially should only be undertaken for some serious purpose; but 
replies to the questions about the immediate reasons why people borrow 
money suggest that a fair amount of loan money does go into what the 
community frowns on as frivolous purposes. In addition, most men appear 
to enjoy making loans to others (87%), and feel a solidary relationship 
established or confirmed, but nearly everyone disliked having debts 
though they often express a despairing resignation about ever being able
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to operate their normal economic life without them.
KwaNgele people now see indebtedness as a permanent condition of modern 
life. Even the elderly man with two pensions quoted above characterized 
debt as inevitable: "I don't like to keep credits myself, but it's 
nature; even whites, who are money-makers, they still have credits."
7. Credi t loops i n the i nformal economy or, how to stay capitalized
Although informal credit is now tightly interlinked with the formal 
economy at a number of points, it still appears to behave in general as 
a functional aspect of a subsistence or peasant-type economy - that is, 
instead of being primarily structured to provide various forms of 
market-related capital, it is adapted to reducing the risk of 
subsistence failure. In the classical subsistence context, this is the 
limiting disaster case where all the household's means of support fail 
simultaneously, exposing the family to an effective siege of starvation, 
an unexpected stretch of time in which they have no way of obtaining 
food and basic necessities. In the modern context, this means running 
completely out of money.
Informal credit therefore develops various methods of ensuring that this 
kind of disaster can be avoided. In doing this, the household's main 
objective is to maintain a reliable and steady flow of income, enough to 
cover running expenses at all times. Since people working in the formal 
job market are often monthly paid, the household which depends entirely 
on wage work is subject to spells of cash shortfall, usually between the 
middle and the end of the month.
One of the major objectives of the informal sector itself frequently 
seems to be this alone - to bring another enterprise into the household's 
economy which will bring in cash on a different and independent cycle 
from that of wage work, regardless of whether or not it actually makes a 
profit over its costs. Informal credit contributes toward the same 
function. Although it also capft alizes economic enterprises, its basic 
purpose is to provide the household's working capital, if the household 
is seen as an enterprise with an internal economy of its own. In doing 
this in areas like KwaNgele, it works very closely with the household's 
various informal enterprises. Consequently, the end goal of the whole credit
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cycle in the informal economy is to transform sporadic earning, informal 
or formal, into a predictable and reliable alternate income stream.
Looked at in this way, both the informal sector and informal credit act 
as a counterweight or balance wheel to offset the timing of income flow 
from the dominant formal sector. Informal borrowing appears to peak at 
times when the flow of formal income leaves the household exposed to its 
chronic cyclic risk. In addition, the informal credit network also 
insures the household against unexpected contingencies and provides for 
relatively large fixed expenditures. This means the household has to be 
able to tap an additional reserve at the point of need, a capacity which 
would be severely curtailed if it were not for another credit loop which 
provides a functional form of loan collateral.
Instead of investing their income above daily requirements in formal 
savings institutions, urban and peri-urban black communities tend to 
save against unpredictable risks by investing in credit obligations.
These include both personal indebtedness and the local credit institutions, 
whether rotating credit groups or the larger credit coops. Saving money 
in debt form transforms a small fluctuating daily cash surplus in income 
into the form of an intangible obligation, which is safe both physically 
and socially, and which can be tapped at a known future date.
For the household, this means that a major objective of informal earning 
is to establish a debt network which can be used as loan collateral
to establish the family's security properly by getting control over the 
unexpected. Since the scheduled payout from an informal credit 
association is also keyed to a cyclical delay, it does not help directly 
with immediate need, and relative safety in relation to emergencies 
comes from being able to borrow on short notice.
This borrowing requires security; and instead of banks' types of 
collateral, the informal credit system assesses creditworthiness on 
ability to repay. Individuals who belong to credit associations then 
use their investment as security to borrow against. Credit then becomes 
available on very short notice, from anyone in the area who may have 
cash on hand, and who will be willing to lend on the security of a 
scheduled payout from a known credit association; Case 3, in 2.1 above,
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is a good illustration. Looked at from this angle, informal credit 
provides capital, credit, and loan security as part of the same cycle, 
in much the same way as the formal banking system.
8. The cognitive map of the credit environment: how people perceive
pureiT fT a f "S'Cu rre? Trf r m f i r --------------------— ■— --------------------------—
Perceptions of possible credit sources offer an easy way onto the 
cognitive map of the credit environment. Respondents were asked which 
of a list of possible lenders were all right to get an interest- 
bearing loan from; the List itself was derived from a pilot 
investigation, and fairly effectively covered the field, as only three 
respondents said there was any other source of credit they would think 
of using. Results indicate that KwaNgele respondents approved in a 
general way of a considerable range of possible loan sources, most of 
which were located in their own local community and fall under the 
heading of informal credit. But if these possible sources are lined 
up in order of their approval rating, the basic shape of cognitive 
credit begins to appear.
Table 5
POTENTIAL SOURCES OF CREDIT: MEN RESPONDENTS' RANK ORDER OF
PREFERENCE
frequency distribution of replies by percent
1 Close relative staying at another house 91%
2 Someone related but not closely 89%
2 Neighbor 89%
2 Friend around home 89%
3 Close relative staying with you 85%
4 Respondent's own stockfel 82%
5 Friend from work 79%
6 Person near home lending money as a business 74%
7 Person near home not related or close to you 68%
8 Another local stockfel 62%
9 Employer 59%
10 Bank or lending institution 26%
N = 34
Looking at the trend of the results here suggests that approval and 
confidence in the credit environment flows outward from its cognitive 
center in a concentric wave form, like ripples in a pool. Although 
the exact sequencing of their results are not the same, both men and
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Table 6.
POTENTIAL SOURCES OF CREDIT: WOMEN RESPONDENTS' RANK ORDER OF
PREFERENCE
frequency distribution of replies by percent
1 Friend near home 97%
2 Som eone related to you but not close h/ 94%
2 Close relative at staying at another rlouse 94%
3 Close relative staying wl th you 91%
3 Neighbor 91%
4 Fri end from work 76%
5 Person near home not related or close to you 68%
6 Your own stockfel 59%
6 Another local stockfel 59%
7 Person near home lends money as a bus-iness 53%
8 Employe r 40%
9 Bank or lending institution 26%
N = 34
women give the most consistent approval to people they are most 
intimately and confidently associated with in their local environment, 
and show progressively less confidence in more distant, less intimate, 
and more impersonal credit sources. Though borrowers are also attracted 
to discretion and privacy, mutual confidence based on long-standing 
personal relationship seems to outweigh privacy by a large margin where 
privacy is the only inducement.
Women, who have on the average less experience in dealing with the urban 
environment, handling wages, and coping with the outside world 
generally, and who also tend tohave significantly lower persona l 
incomes, tend to be more distinctly localite in their thinking than men; 
but a similar decline of confidence as potential loan sources move away 
from the face-to-face social contact of the locality is evident in both 
cases. Men are more likely than women to approve of borrowing from 
employers, but the relatively massive lack of confidence in approaching 
formal lending institutions is roughly the same for both at 26% 
approval.
The relatively sophisticated citizens of KwaNgele live ten minutes away 
from Pinetown and are normally quite familiar with urban life; both men 
and women sometimes seem to spend a large part of their lives riding 
back and forth to and from town on public transport. If modernization is
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in the old sense of Lerner and Rogers the process of moving away from 
Localism and becoming a citizen of the world, then it may be significant 
that the KwaNgele sample does not show more willingness to approach 
formal lending institutions in the urban environment. This is more 
noticeable since as rural black communities go financially, KwaNgele 
also stands better than most.
However, only three people in the sample admitted to ever having taken 
bank loans - an elderly traditional man, a young well-educated woman, 
and a less-educated young man who smugly described himself as a bank 
employee. Nor did anyone, among all the suspicious and fearful comments 
about banks, ever make the point that bank loans are cheaper than 
interest-bearing informal credit. If banks managed to put this point 
across, their acceptability might rapidly increase; but comments still 
suggest that their image is one of authoritarian remoteness which 
enforces an abject discomfort on the borrower.
Particular ly, respondents associate banks with hard loan terms which do 
not take account of circumstances, and with the danger of losing your 
property or being put in jail. Among those who did approve, remarks 
suggested that it takes a person with a cool nerve and ready assets to 
deal successfully with a bank.
Table 7
"BEST" PERCEIVED SOURCE OF CREDIT 
percentage distribution
close relative at home
MEN
29
WOMEN
35 22
close relative another house 3 12 5
neighbor — 6 2
local friend 3 9 4
own stockfel 21 6 9
other stockfel 3 _ 1
distant relative - 3 1
local unrelated person 6 - 2
local lender 6 3 3
work friend 9 9 6
employer 12 12 8
bank 9 6 5
34 34 N = 68
Asking respondents to sort out from the list of possible loan sources 
the "best" and "worst" ones shows a different aspect of the credit map.
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Instead of the very wide spread of sources that meet with approval in 
principle, a few categories stand out and seem to account for most of 
the cognitive workspace involved in thinking about lending.
Table 8
"WORST" PERCEIVED SOURCE OF CREDIT 
percentage distribution
close relative at home
MEN
21
WOMEN
12 11
close relative another house 3 — 1
neighbor 6 12 6
local friend - 6 2
own stockfel 18 21 13
other stockfel 6 3 3
distant relative - - 0
local unrelated person 3 6 3
local lender 6 6 4
work friend 6 6 4
emp loyer - - 0
bank 32 27 20
34 34 N = 68
The cognitive point of departure is the category *c l ose relative in 
home", which concentrates by far the most attention of any category of 
possible lender. About a third of the sample, both men and women, put 
forward the members of their own household as their preferred loan 
source, and relatively high percentages also cited the same people as 
the worst possibility. Clearly, the people in the KwaNgele sample 
look first to their own co-resident family when they think about 
borrowing, and form their evaluation on the basis of the treatment 
they individually get.
Working outward, it looks as if people vaguely and generally approve 
of the idea of borrowing from other relatives and people around home, 
but need not actually focus much attention on the possibility of doing 
so. For men, no loan source within their personal network other than 
their own household seems to have real significance. Once outside 
the home, the next stop in their cognitive map of loan sources appears 
to be their own stockfel.
In contrast, women in the sample appear still to feel themselves more 
embedded in the kinship network and less comfortable with semi- 
impersonal groups like credit associations - or, less able to cope
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financially with the demands of repaying a fairly delimited and 
bounded type of credit.
Once the people of their own home have been taken into consideration, 
a mosaic of other individual connections on the local scene seem to 
retain their significance as back-up loan sources in preference to any 
stockfels. More women (21%) pointed out their own stockfel as their 
worst credit source than indicated any other category within their 
regular orbit. The men in the sample seem to see their credit 
environment differently. For them, this function of alternate loan 
source within easy reach of home seems to have been taken over by the 
less personal agency of the prospective borrower's own stockfel.
Once outside the local context, a second credit focus appears, less 
strong than the ones in the home area: 12% of men and women
respondents alike chose thei r employer as best-liked source of credit, 
and 9% each way selected friend from work. And at the same time, 
while another 6% each of men and women also identified a friend at 
work as their least-liked credit source, no one identified the 
employer category as least-liked.
Finally, at the extreme outer margin of the cognitive map, and 
frightening as the forest in Grimm's Fairy Tales, can be found the 
formal credit market, in the person of the final impersonal outside 
agency, the bank. Unlike employers, banks as lenders seem to draw the 
lightning of anxiety and disapproval from this semi-rural population. 
They form the strongest single focus of dislike for both men and women, 
at 32% and 27% respectively. In cognitive terms they seem to exert the 
reverse polarity of the close though anxious attention drawn around the 
concept of the family or close, in-dwelling relative as credit source - 
with the exception that for the family members negative feelings are 
apparently balanced or outweighed by positive aspects, 29 - 21% for men 
and 35 - 12% for women. In the case of the big urban lending 
institutions, any positive attraction seems to be pretty well swamped by 
negative associations: the difference was 9 - 32% for men, and 6 - 27%
for women.
It is also worth noting here that education is not clearly the main 
factor involved here: of the men who were willing to consider banks as
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a credit source, 55% were completely uneducated men of semi-traditional 
outlook. Only two, or 22%, were younger educated men of modern outlook.
The factors involved form a clear pattern. The main dimensions on which 
the community evaluates the acceptability of potential lenders are 
fivefold: cost, the question of whether the borrower will have to pay
interest or not; discretion, whether or not the lender will respect the 
borrower's desire for privacy at all times; patience, the quality of 
being willing or unwilling to be flexible about repayment; sympathy, or 
ubuntu, human warmth and the quality of responding to the borrower's 
need; and reliability, dependability in observing the (usually verbal) 
loan agreement. To these can be added the usually less important 
factors of access, or convenience; timing, the quick availability of 
credit; profit, or making money on the deal; and standing, the effect on 
the borrower's reputation.
From these, the ones that figure most largely in choosing a 'best' loan 
source are discretion and sympathy (23% each), followed by patience 
(18%). Profit ranks well down, joint third at 11%. For designating a 
'worst' selection, lack of sympathy ranks first (26%), followed closely 
by impatience (24%). Banks ran up a higher score on impatience (54% of 
mentions in the category) than any other category for any other negative 
or positive factor. They also made 100% of the scoring in the negative 
category of inaccessibility. They made noticeable positive scoring only 
for discretion, with 14% of mentions in that category.
By comparison, close relatives scored well for discretion, sympathy, and 
giving Loans for no interest, and badly again for lack of sympathy, 
indicating that people expect sympathy from their families and don't 
always get it. Employers were worth noticing for having no negative 
score whatever, (probably due to other candidates for 'worst' status 
seeming more urgent and deserving) plus modest positive scores for 
patience, sympathy and foregoing interest. Unlike banks at the present 
moment, a human relationship of some sort exists between KwaNgele 
respondents and their employers. This may be unfortunate, if is true 
that the rates of interest for informal credit are rising so rapidly 
(from 12% to 25-50% in two years) partly partly because the traffic 
will bear the increase and there is no formaL-sector competition to slow
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it down.
9. Assessment; development policy in relation to credit_______ _
The foregoing may then suggest that the problem in relation to credit 
should not be seen primarily as one of capitalizing agriculture. 
Agriculture is of tremendous importance in alleviating actual want; and 
as perhaps the major activity in the production sector, it retains great 
economic significance. It is also more important to the local economy 
in the poorest outlying districts than in the relatively better-off 
peri-urban zone. At the same time, what is likely to be of equal 
or perhaps even greater urgency is the question of getting the maximum 
possible benefit from the circulation of urban wage earnings by 
capitalizing the informal sector more generally, while avoiding the 
loss of local savings into large urban institutions as much as 
possible. In both of these objectives, informal credit seems to be not 
just the main means at present, but possibly in some respects the most 
effect ive.
In a number of other respects, formal credit might be able to do better. 
The chief limitation of informal credit is its very high cost.
This kind of cost factor is the main reason which Polly Hill notes as 
having caused colonial authorities and present-day development 
planners to dislike informal credit and try to stamp it out. Hill's 
position seems to be the correct one when she argues that it is a great 
mistake to try to suppress informal credit: it is normally an essential
part of rural life, and in addition it is likely to be all there is - 
the only viable form of credit available outside of the cities. It 
tends to be an unfortunate fact that official lending programs may be 
enormously cheaper, but they characteristical ly don't seem to reach the 
poverty section of the community (Hill, 1982, 217).
Questions relating to the potential role of credit in rural 
development within greater South Africa are then likely to be shaped 
by what will hopefully emerge as a debate over the possible role of 
formal credit. The limitations of informal credit tend to be assumed, 
if it is taken into account at all; but it is also necessary to 
consider the very serious limitations of formal credit in impoverished 
rural areas.
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The initiatives relating to mortgaging which are already going forward 
are to get land freed to be used as an asset in the credit market, so it 
can be pledged as security to capitalize rural agriculture. Results 
from this study among others suggest that it ought to be questioned 
whether this is really necessary, or if it is, then under what conditions 
it is necessary and under what conditions it is likely to succeed.
Formal loans are not only cumbersome, impersonal, and inaccessible - 
they are also a good way for rural people to lose their only assets.
How to get formal credit into the rural economy on a viable basis needs 
debate before it needs inadequately considered policy.
What needs to be established then is the real need for development- 
related credit - either for agricultural or other types of informal 
economic activity - in the present and probable future context.
Evidence collected so far in the peri-urban zone suggests that the 
interaction of saving, capital, informal lending, and formal-sector 
credit is fairly complex, and different positions appear in the 
literature as to the value for development purposes of different types 
of formal and informal credit. But the known situation does have 
implications for the capitalization of agriculture.
As has been reported elsewhere for this same sample (Cross 1985), 
agriculture has a relatively low priority among household enterprises in 
regions of this type. It is also a very risky enterprise, and difficult 
to manage in terms of its labor demand. In addition, it doesn't fit 
well into the turnover cycle of informal credit.
Because of the long time gap between any cash return from one season's 
crop and the demand for capital at the next planting, agriculture as an 
informal activity is atypical. The informal credit market tends 
to provide loan credit on a very short-terms basis in most cases, and at 
comparatively high rates of interest. This kind of credit structure is 
an acceptable backup for the selling operations in the small-scale 
informal sector to which it is adapted, where the amounts of capital 
needed are relatively small and turnover is rapid and continuous; 
however, it doesn't suit agriculture. Unfortunately, the same is 
probably true of formal credit. Peri-urban agriculture is small-scale.
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informally run, and subsidiary to wage work in the household economy.
All indications are that it will stay that way.
Getting an informal loan of any size to capitalize cultivation is an 
expensive proposition if the rates for loans over a month to six months 
reach 25% or more, as they seem to. Likewise, neither the interest nor 
the principle is likely to be recouped directly from the profits of 
selling the product. But the same applies to formal sector credit from 
the opposite side: loans of the size needed are too small to be
economic, let alone justify a mortgage.
What may turn out to be most successful in helping peri-urban families 
to intensify their agriculture successfully might be to attack the 
constraint structure from a different direction. The principle of 
making the inputs themselves (seed, fertilizer, insecticide, sometimes 
implements) directly available (just before planting, at pension payout 
points) in a cheap standard package form has been successfully used in 
Indonesia (N e^sweek , 3| Ma rch , 198©' as well as in other places.
Together with assistance in marketing and/or a guaranteed floor price 
for produce (made available later in the season at same place), and 
possibly cheap crop insurance, this kind of assistance in overcoming the 
bottleneck in obtaining inputs might make agriculture a more attractive 
investment. In these conditions, peri-urban families might even be 
tempted to put the necessary money and labor into plowing and weeding.
Should it be needed, informal credit for agriculture-related shortfalls 
might then also become a more attractive proposition if a good return 
were made more probable and the opportunity cost reduced. In this kind 
of formulation, the need for formal credit would not be very great, and 
mortgaging as a policy measure to capitalize agriculture would probably 
be not only unnecessary but also counter-productive - and probably 
dangerous. Informal credit, while not ideal, could probably fill the 
gaps as they occur.
This is not to say that credit should not be made available from the 
format sector - only, that this will not be easy. If it is expected 
that formal credit will take over the burden of development-related 
rural lending as soon as possible, then this conclusion can only be
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reached by ignoring what has now been conceded for the rest of the rural 
economy: that distribution problems lie at the heart of rural poverty.
In other words, that rural poverty is not a question of how much is 
produced or how much is available, but where in the space economy its 
production and distribution makes it available. In rural areas, very 
few formal-sector products are available on an over-the-counter basis.
Formal urban credit to some extent follows von Thunen's model of the 
ideal space economy - certain kinds of credit are available and economic 
only at certain locations. Formal urban types of credit, which are 
usually highly bureaucratic and expensive to administer, are likely to 
be economic chiefly in urban and developed areas where the shape and 
turnover of the credit market can sustain them. It appears that there 
is going to be a lot of scope for the new forms of credit which Nattrass 
and Glass have called for.
10. Ana lysis: providing for the future demand for rura l credit
Whatever is done in regard to supplying effective credit to rural 
communities will have to take account of the existing structures defined 
by informal credit. Here is Schaefei— Kehnert and von Pischke, writing 
in the journal Savings and Development on the issue of informal credit 
in a modern agricultural lending program for Third World countries:
"In most developing countries noninstitutional credit will remain an 
important element of rural financial markets and at the least should be 
regarded as a supplementary source of financing in agricultural credit 
po l icy...However, noni nst itut i ona 1 credit exhibits shortcomings that 
cannot be overlooked. It is hardly adequate for large investment plans, 
and it cannot easily provide medium- and long-term loans for such plans. 
For small farmers it may not be more costly than conventional bank 
credit, but institutional credit could potentially be more efficiently 
organized..." (1986, 9)
In relation to the chances for banks, they add:
"Private banks in most developing countries have little interest in 
agaricultura l credit and seldom participate in credit programs for small 
farmers...on the other hand_, many state credit institutions are not in 
a position to attract savings deposi ts...agri cu l tura l credit programs 
thus rely largely on government funds.-these interventions by the state 
may very well “be two-edged..." (1986, 19, 22)
Results from the KwaNgele credit study suggest that capitalizing 
agriculture is not the only issue in this type of area. Instead, 
the main issue for credit is likely to be the possibilities for making 
credit effectively available in relation to two main forms of demand:
1. capital loans into the production and distribution sectors in 
the R 200-1000 bracket, where informal loans are often not
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available, or if obtained may need very high interest;
2. backstop credit for the day-to-day needs of consumption, and 
particularly for the poor, where cash shortfalls are not 
always made up by informal credit.
In this context, the most serious problem with informal credit is 
probably the high interest rates for interest-bearing loans, coupled 
with the uncertain availability of interest-free credit. It is likely 
that not very much can be done about prevailing interest rates, which 
respond to what the traffic will bear; but it is at least possible that 
providing some competition, in the form of larger loans available at 
somewhat lower interest rates, might help to slow their rise.
In the light of this kind of analysis of the actual demand for 
development-related credit, two possibilities occur for bringing in 
the formal sector to help. One concerns making formal-sector loan money 
available in the R 300 or higher category, and the other relates to the 
chances for formal-sector savings entering directly into the rural 
community.
10.1 Recommendat ions: employers as a_ veh i cle of forma l loaning
One possibility which has been drawing attention lately is the idea of 
routing loans through the urban employers of rural-based workers. The 
preliminary results of the KwaNgele credit survey suggest that this idea 
may have some unanticipated potential. Employers now appear to figure 
in the local credit environment as a significant source of larger loans. 
As potential lenders, they have a moderately good percentage of 'best' 
ratings, interestingly balanced against a total absence of 'worst' 
attributions. Although there seems to be suspicion and reserve 
associated with the idea of borrowing from employers, a lot of this may 
be due to the inja nekati factor, the perception that workers and bosses 
are natural enemies, and to not wanting to be in a position of asking 
for favors from the dominant side in a tense and charged relationship.
Lending programs through employers would at least put formal credit on 
the normal trip route of rural workers; and it would also have the
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very significant advantage of placing the loan transaction in one of the 
acceptable zones of the cognitive credit map. If prospective borrowers 
dislike the idea of entering unknown country in order to look for 
something as important and intimate as a loan, then putting the 
immediate transaction into a relationship which is known and tested, 
familiar and to some degree acceptable, make be an important step in 
making it acceptable as well as accessible.
In this light, it might then be worked by enabling the formal lending 
institutions of the urban credit market to lend funds through firms or 
through private employers. Alternately, firms willing to try it might 
borrow money from the government at subsidized rates to serve as loan 
capital. Interest rates charged to workers would clearly have to be 
very low, to avoid suspicion of profiteering at the expense of the 
workers. But in addition, it is extremely important that these low-
interst loans must be portable. That is, they must be designed so that
the worker doesn't get into the position of finding himself tied to one 
firm and unable to change jobs because of his credit obligation to his
present firm; this is the type of practice which has deservedly given
capitalism such a bad name in the past (see Cunnison, 1973, for a 
contemporary example).
Instead, the worker would have to be able to transfer his loan to 
another workplace very easily, more or less just by signing for his 
(standardized, computerized) loan passbook and taking it across to his 
new firm. In addition, it would probably need to have a ceiling 
attached - something like a month's salary, or an average month's salary 
for the industry - to make sure that workers don't get in too deep. On 
these conditions an easily available loan between R 300 and R 1000 might 
go a long way towards filling the credit gap left by informal lending; 
and might even, if administered cheaply enough and/or subsidized as a 
way for firms to improve their images, break even financially.
Lastly, it would,have to be made crystal clear at all stops that the 
process is entirely voluntary. Enough distrust has been aroused already 
by the misunderstandings over pension funds to make it clear this kind 
of system could not be based on any kind of intra-firm levy. The 
potential for false steps to go wrong is very evident in the fairly
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negative general attitude associated with employer credit in the early 
replies to the KwaNgele credit survey.
10.2 recommendations: formal savings to secure i nformal loans
The second problem, that of providing money out of the formal sector 
directly into the rural community itself, requires a point of contact to 
be established where the community and the outside credit market can 
come together. As Hill and Schaefer-Kehnert and von Pischke have 
commented, efforts by the formal sector - private banks and government - 
are not easily likely to succeed as they are usually set up. But if it 
is conceded at the outset that day-to-day credit will have to be 
informal^ then it may be possible to link the formal and informal 
credit cycles in a way that may serve the purpose. That way, the 
problem can be resolved into how to allow people with low incomes to 
secure a line of informal credit. In this respect, formal savings may 
be more useful than formal loans.
What might work is to encourage the organized credit market - 
alternatively the government - to oversee the establishment of a rural 
savings bank, to be run on a cooperative basis if possible. The 
necessary contact point might then be provided at rural pension payouts, 
which take place on a rotating basis every second month. If 
representatives of the new bank were to appear in rural communities 
on pension days, fully equipped with stamps, quadruplicate forms and all 
the usual equipment to register transactions, they might be made the 
next stop in the queue after the paying out of rural pensions. With 
money in hand and the need for cash not yet overwhelming, the chances 
that people in the low-income pension category could be persuaded to 
start a savings account are probably as high as they ever could be.
In addition, local markets tend to form around pension payouts, drawing 
local informal-sector operators (Cross, 1981, 1985; Preston-Whyte,
1985). These people would then also get the most convenient access to a 
savings facility.'
Chances for savings formation might be further improved if a kind of 
lottery were added in, where a certain number of depositors each month 
could win a triple pension (or the actuarial cash equivalent for younger
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people) for life. In this type of set-up contact between the savings 
bank operation and the community would then be possible only once in two 
months; but this could be enough to fullfill its objectives.
Money from these accounts could then be re-lent to rura l people wanting 
small or medium-sized capital loans, whether for construction, informal 
enterprise, or any reasonable purpose. However, any enabling 
legislation to set up such a bank would have to include the provision 
that rural savings could not be used in the developed core economy, but 
would have to be used to cover development needs in rural areas. On 
this basis, government or the Development Bank might conceivably be 
convinced to provide matching funding.
But the main purpose of this kind of savings exercise would not be 
primarily the mobilizing of development capital. Instead, the goal 
would be to enable holders of savings books to establish a line of 
informal credit within their own home community, which they can then 
tap, in between actual contact with the savings bank on oension days, 
to obtain credit against both daily expenditures and emergency needs.
A plan of this kind might not work as anticipated; careful pilot 
research and experimentation would be needed to establish its real-world 
chances. But doing it like this might enable a new savings and credit 
resource to come into being, which would work along lines which are 
known and understood in the community. By arranging this kind of a link 
between formal credit and the informal credit cycle, it may be possible 
to create more benefits than might be supplied by either alone.
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